

"Joint Seminar with Guest Researchers":

Erik Thomson from University of Manitoba
and

Pamela Sharpe from University of Tasmania

When? **Thursday May 16, at 9.00-12.00**

Where? **Room 1005, Norra Beteendevetarhuset**

- 9.00-10.20 Erik Thomson: *"Jan Hoeyff and the Thirty Years War: An essay on diplomatic history's limits"*
 - 10.20-10.40: Coffee break
- 10.40-12.00 Pamela Sharpe: *"Age, Birth Order, Gender and Authority in Early Modern England: Evidence from a Micro-Study"*

Feeling curious already? Read Erik Thomson's work below!

Jan Hoeufft and the Thirty Years War: An essay on diplomatic history's limits

Erik Thomson, University of Manitoba

The word “essay” in the title should suggest that I am here engaging in a speculative piece of work, with much future research to be done, if it seems worthwhile, both about the specific people involved and the broader arguments. As many historians have observed, historians of Europe for a little more than the past decade have been engaged in a renaissance of diplomatic history, producing new work both in a traditional cast and a self-consciously “new diplomatic history” that aims to introduce new theories and methodologies and an interdisciplinary approach to the subject.¹ In many ways, this history must seem less than new for Swedish historians, for some of them have anticipated some of the recent questions posed as novelties by researchers elsewhere. These include Arne Losman’s studies of Carl Gustav Wrangel’s European networks, the careful work done on international war finance, Bertil Rimbourg’s study of Magnus Durell’s procuring information and, more recently, Steve Murdoch’s accounts of Scottish-centred networks, and Heiko Droste’s study of agents in Swedish employment that emphasizes and explores their personal relations, interests, attributes, and agency.² (As Daniel Riches points out in a recent book, Swedish historiography has perhaps taken religious motivations too lightly, but that may be a more general problem.)³ Readers of such historiography would be familiar with many of the points of the new diplomatic history thus far. Rather than an idealized state being constructed with agents who articulate and enact state policy, a more complicated and interesting picture emerges with

¹ Most programmatically, John Watkins, “Toward a New Diplomatic History of Medieval and Early Modern Europe,” *Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies* 38, 1 (Winter, 2008), 1-14. See also Toby Osborne, *Dynasty and diplomacy in the Court of Savoy: Political Culture and the Thirty Years’ War*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). In France, Lucien Bély’s *Espions et ambassadeurs au temps de Louis XIV* (Paris : Fayard, 1990) has played an important historiographical role, as has his recent *L’Art de la paix en Europe: Naissance de la diplomatie moderne XVIe-XVIIIe siècle*. (Paris : Presses universitaires de France, 2007). The sense of a renaissance in Germany has been less pronounced than in English and French scholarship, as the subject never vanished from prominence. See Sven Externbrink, “Internationale Politik in der Frühen Neuzeit: Stand und Perspektiven der Forschung zu Diplomatie und Staatensystem,” in *Geschichte der Politik: Alte und Neue Wege*. (*Historische Zeitschrift*, Beihefte, N.F. 44) (Munich, 2007): 15-39, and Michael Rohrschneider, “Neue Tendenzen der diplomatie-geschichtlichen Erforschung des Westfälischen Friedenskongresses,” in *Pax Perpetua: Neuere Forschungen zum Frieden in der Frühen Neuzeit*. Inken Schmidt-Voges, Siegrid Westphal, Volker Arnke and Tobias Bartke, eds. (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2010), 103-121.

² Arne Losman, *Carl Gustaf Wrangel och Europa*. (Uppsala: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1980), Hans Landberg, Lars Ekholm, Roland Nordlund and Sven A. Nilsson, *Det kontinentala krigets ekonomi: Studier i krigsfinansiering under svensk stormaktstid*. (Lund: Scandinavian University Books, 1971), Bertil Rimborg, *Magnus Durell och Danmark: Studier i information*. (Göteborg: Historiska institutionen, 1997), Steve Murdoch, *Network North: Scottish Kin, Commercial and Covert Associations in Northern Europe, 1603-1746*. (Leiden: Brill, 2005), and Heiko Droste, *Im Dienst der Krone: Schwedische Diplomaten im 17. Jahrhundert*. (Berlin: LIT, 2006).

³ Daniel Riches, *Protestant cosmopolitanism and Diplomatic culture: Brandenburg-Swedish relations in the Seventeenth Century*. (Leiden: Brill, 2012). For the broader point, Otfried Czaika, “Entwicklungslinien der Historiographie zu Reformation und Konfessionalisierung in Skandinavien seit 1945,” *Archiv für Reformationsgeschichte*. 100 (2009): 116-137.

informal networks able to accomplish as much as formal institutions. In line with recent scholarship that has emphasized the importance of such factors such as patronage and elite accommodation, historians of early modern diplomacy ignore diplomats' personal ideas, interests and interactions at their peril, for such personal factors limited, shaped and created many of the opportunities for the formulation and execution of policy.

Despite the richness of both international and national historiographies on early modern diplomatic culture, however, there are serious tensions amongst the different approaches. Many historians remain interested upon the formation of high policy, and its realization, above all, in grand treaty negotiations. Other historians emphasize the development of "modern" diplomatic institutions. Such historians can fit within an older, nationalistic view of the development of state institutions, as Madeleine Haehl, for instance, in a 2006 study of the institutions of foreign affairs, portrays Cardinal Richelieu as creating a diplomatic service that would "know how to respond to the exigencies of a politics that would make the king of France the arbiter of Europe."⁴ Still others see the development of permanent institutions of diplomacy that eventually enabled the grounding of a "state system". For example, Heinz Schilling argues that the period saw a monopolization of foreign policy that included the "institutional construction and professionalization of modern diplomacy."⁵

I do not want, however, to give the impression that there is a choice between formal bureaucratic operations and flexible and personal relations. As David Parrott points out in his excellent new book on military entrepreneurs *The business of war*, there is "no necessary incompatibility between the growth of the power of the state and the development of a substantial sphere of private military activity."⁶ In this paper, I will argue that there is no necessary incompatibility between the growth of informal networks and the means of negotiation and the elaboration of a more formal diplomatic system, but that the ties between finance, military enterprise and diplomacy need to be examined more systematically.⁷ I will examine the career of an emissary who played a central role in the diplomacy of the Thirty Years War, the reaction to him by more formal diplomatic representatives, and what he reveals about the capabilities and limitations of the formal ambassadorial system during the period. I will concentrate upon the too obscure figure of the arms dealer, banker and French and Dutch representative Jan Hoeffft. In many ways, Hoeffft served as the centre point of the financial networks which linked France and its Protestant allies and military agents. Because of his networks—both familial and carefully constituted—and his credit, he was trusted even in political missions, where the officially accredited ambassadors were not. Formal ambassadors

⁴ Madeleine Haehl, *Les affaires étrangères au temps de Richelieu: Le secrétariat d'État, les agents diplomatiques (1624-1642)*. (Bruxelles: Peter Lang, for the Ministère des Affaires étrangères, 2006), 308. In this, she differs little from Camille Georges Picavet, *La diplomatie Française au temps de Louis XIV (1661-1715) : Institutions, moeurs et coutumes* (Paris : Felix Alcan, 1930), 6-9.

⁵ Heinz Schilling, *Konfessionalisierung und Staatsintressen: Internationale Beziehungen, 1559-1660*. Handbuch der Geschichte der Internationalen Beziehungen, 2. (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2007), 23-24. His perspective goes well with the standard recent English survey, M.S. Anderson, *The Rise of Modern Diplomacy, 1450-1919*. (Harlow; Longman, 1993).

⁶ David Parrott, *The Business of War: Military Enterprise and Military Revolution in Early Modern Europe*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012). Mats Hallenberg's *Statsmakt till salu: Arrendesystemet och privatisering av skatteuppbörden i det svenska riket*. (Lund: Nordic Academic Press, 2008), makes a similar point, though not about military entrepreneurship specifically.

⁷ But see Regina Schulte, « Rüstung, Zins, und Frömmigkeit: Niederländische Calvinisten als Finanziere des Dreissigjährigen Krieges, » *Bohemia : Jahrbuch des Collegium Carolinum* 35(1994): 45-62, and Michel Kaiser, "Jan von Werth zwischen Wittelsbach und Habsburg: Kriegsunternehmertum und Patronage im Dreißigjährigen Krieg," *Zeitschrift für bayerische Landesgeschichte* 75 (2012): 135-166.

complained about Heoufft and other interlopers from mercantile circles in roles they believed were reserved to them, using their resistance as occasions to try to reiterate the vision of the ambassador as a quintessentially aristocratic trade, in a moment when central control was in practice reducing their roles. Yet such mercantile emissaries not only revealed the difficulty it required to combine all the functions of an ambassador—representation, negotiation, information gathering, and financial and mercantile organization—but also helped emphasize a new vision of political prudence and the capacity to act as central to ambassadorial quality.

Introducing Jean Hoeufft, Banker

Subsidy payments were a crucial element in French foreign relations throughout the early modern period, although they have not been the object of systematic study. These payments played a prominent part in maintaining France's anti-Spanish and anti-Imperial alliances during Louis XIII's reign, and particularly those with Protestant powers, despite the opposition of Catholic *dévots* who believed such support for heretics incompatible with the king's piety. Richelieu, in his *Testament politique* praised Louis' actions in "taking up the purse and not the sword" before the 1635 outbreak of open war, when the King of France would brandish his sword in one hand while keeping his purse in the other.⁸ The subsidy payments involved transactions that by their very nature were complex, as financial intermediaries were obliged by treaty to provide large sums of money in a specified currency, at a given date and location, when war was straining the credit of many mercantile families across Europe.⁹ During the sixteenth and early seventeenth century, emissaries often took on the payment of subsidies along the side of their other tasks, sometimes in conjunction with bankers and merchants.¹⁰ As early as 1626, Richelieu recognized the peculiar demands of subsidy payments when he noted that any anti-Spanish alliance would require that "those who enter into it would each provide a solvent banker who would respond and oblige themselves."¹¹

While of course there were large numbers of French merchants who carried on foreign trade, payments of subsidies was not a job that just any merchant could undertake. It required access to large pools of capital and credit, connections to both mercantile and ruling circles in both countries, and commercial as well as political savvy. As Françoise Bayard has documented, the number of merchants of foreign origin engaged in France's royal finance was relatively small after the wars of religion.¹² Jean Hoeufft came from a family that was originally from

⁸ "Si c'est un effet d'une prudence singulière d'avoir occupé dix ans durant toutes les forces des ennemis de vostre Estat par celles de vos alliez en mettant la main à la bourse et non aux armes. . . » *Testament politique*. Françoise Hildesheimer, ed. (Paris : Société de l'histoire de France, 1995), 74.

⁹ For example, the great financier and diplomat Philip Calandrini failed in 1633, taking down many of the members of the Burlamachi family at the same time. See A.V. Judges, "Philip Burlamachi: a financier of the Thirty Years War," *Economica*, 6 (1926): 285-300, and Ole Peter Grell, *Brethren in Christ: A Calvinist Network in Reformation Europe*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 92-101.

¹⁰ Thus Jacques Bongars uses his contacts with Nikolas Malapert, Caesar Calandrini, and Daniel van der Meulen to make payments, see Ruth Kohlendorfer-Fries, *Diplomatie und Gelehrtenrepublik: Die Kontakte des französischen Gesandten Jacques Bongars. (1554-1612)*, (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 2009), and Benjamin Aubery du Maurier supervised subsidy payments to the Dutch, see Claire Martin, ed. *Mémoires de Benjamin Aubery du Maurier (1566-1636)* (Geneva: Droz, 2010), particularly introduction, 132-135.

¹¹ "Advis sur les affaires présentes qu'a le Roy en février 1626" in *Les Papiers de Richelieu: Section politique Intérieure*. . . Pierre Grillon, ed. (Paris: Pedone, 1975-), I, # 41, 298, "Quelque traicté qu'on fasse, il faut que ceux qui y entreront donnent chacun un banquier solvable qui responde et s'oblige de faire tenir en tous les lieux où sera l'armée les monstres de chaque prince. « @

¹² Françoise Bayard, *Le Monde des financiers au XVIIe siècle*. (Paris : Flammarion, 1988), 253. Only 27 of 595 financiers with known geographical origins were of foreign birth.

Roermond, a little town between Aachen and Eindhoven.¹³ Having converted to the Reformed faith, his parents had fled from that town to Liège, where he was born in 1578. While his parents moved on to Heinsberg, his siblings fled to other places. The daughters in the family established themselves in Cologne, for the most part, and his older brother Christophe in Utrecht. Most importantly, his oldest brother Diderick passed through London before settling in Dordrecht, where he engaged in a wide variety of ventures including draining polders, naval equipment and copper smelting. Diderick married Anne Luis, and they had a family who successfully established themselves in Dutch elite circles. Jean Hoeufft [Jr.] became Lord of Fontaine le Comte and dean of Utrecht Cathedral, and married Elisabeth Coijmans, daughter of the *richissime* Amsterdam merchant Balthasar Coijmans, whose first son married Elias Trip's daughter Maria. Another son, Diderick, married Marie du Witt in 1641—sister of the Grand Pensioner of Holland. Finally, Mattieu became mayor of Dordrecht, marrying Marie Swerts de Landas.¹⁴

Little is known of his early life. He seems never to have married; one presumes that he, like his parents, belonged to the Reformed faith. In Liège, he most likely became familiar with people who would play a major role in the arms and metals trade, including Louis de Geer and the Trip brothers.¹⁵ In June, 1601, he was naturalized as a French subject, resident in Rouen, along with two other people from Antwerp and Flanders, where he engaged in the transit trade with goods in the Netherlands and the Iberian peninsula.¹⁶ He may have become involved in loans to sovereigns, for the Dutch merchant Abraham Cabeliau wrote Swedish King Carl IX, denying that he had told Hoeufft that the Swedish king had no money.¹⁷ His brother Diderick's affairs began to take off in the late 1610s, when he was clearly engaged with the Admiralty of Rotterdam and applied for a patent for a copper mill that he had invented.¹⁸ By 1621, he was named as Louis XIII's "Camerheer" in the Resolutions of the States General, procuring material for galleys for the Duke of Geer to use against pirates off Marseilles with the help of the French ambassador Du Maurier.¹⁹ This was large purchase involving 120,000 *ponds* of lead, coal, tar, one hundred muskets, and eventually, twelve large cannon and several smaller ones.²⁰ Perhaps because of this naval work, and perhaps because of his contacts with the Parisian iron

¹³ Hoeufft—spelled in many variations including Heuft or even Oeft—has been a relatively obscure figure. The best account is now Raphaël Morera, *L'assèchement des marais en France au XVIIe siècle*. (Rennes : Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2011), 114-122. Valuable contributions were made by Eduard de Dienne, *Histoire du dessèchement des lacs et marais de France avant 1789*. (Paris : Champion, 1891), and Fritz Redlich, *The German Military Enterpriser and his Workforce : A Study in European Economic and Social History*. (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1964-65), particularly 407-408.

¹⁴ For this genealogy, I rely on Morera, *Op. Cit.*, de Dienne, *Histoire du dessèchement*, particularly the geneological table in Table A, and "Jan Heouffft" @in *Nieuw Nederlandsch Biografisch Woordenboek* (Leiden: A.W. Sijthoff, 1911-1937), deel. 7, col. 597.

¹⁵ On Liège's role, see Claude de Moreau de Gerbehaye, "Järnhanteringens utveckling i södra delen av provinsen Luxemburg, 1500-1800," in Anders Florén and Gunnar Ternhag, eds. *Valloner-järnets människor* (Hedemora: Gidlunds, 2002), 27-46, Glaude Gaier, *Four centuries of Liège gunmaking*. (Liège: Eugène Wahle, 1985), and Jean Yernaux, *La métallurgie liégeoise et son expansion au XVIIe siècle*. (Liège : G. Thone, 1939).

¹⁶ Copie in Rouen, Archives départementales de Seine-Maritime, C 1260, f. 1 recto. For the business connections, I'm following Morera, *Op.Cit.*, who cites works by J. Bottin and P. Jeannin which I have yet to obtain and read; I found a brief search in Rouen's archives unrevealing.

¹⁷ J. Römelingh, ed. *Een Rondgang langs Zweedse archieven: Een onderzoek naar archivalia inzake de betrekkingen tussen Nederland en Zweden, 1520-1920*. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1986), 109.

¹⁸ See 27 September 1619 #1679, and 13 October 1620 #4103, in *Resolutiën der Staten-Generaal*. J.G. Smit and J. Roelerink, eds. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981), *Nieuwe reeks*, 4, p. 252 and 626. Hereafter RSG.

¹⁹ 29 May 1621, #1044, RSG, 5, p. 165.

²⁰ 21 June 1621, #1185, RSG, 5, p. 186, and 1 July 1621, #1274, RSG, 5, 200.

merchant Pierre Lignage—who served as the treasurer for Charles de Gonzaga, the Duke de Nevers, he was able to serve as a procurer for his brother Diderick, to construct and arm the fleet that the Duke assembled for a Crusade (but which was seized by the Duke of Soubise and ended up being a Protestant fleet at La Rochelle.)²¹ During the 1620s, his business seems to have expanded rapidly. In 1624, he provided the caution for 100,000 livres of a total of 275,000 for Henry Prevost, one of the commissioners of the artillery of France, for the purchase of fifty cannon.²² In the same year, he exported 600,000 *pond* of saltpetre from Lorraine to the Netherlands, which began a fairly regular trade run by Pieter and his brother Diderick.²³ Louis XIII asked permission for him to export 100,000 *pond* of lead and 120,000 *pond* of powder the following March.²⁴ His success in doing business for the French king attracted the notice of other major arms dealers. When writing his partner Pieter Trip to tell him to stop extending credit to the French in 1627, Louis de Geer commented that “I know that French court all too well. Hoeufft hasn’t gotten much from there. He would have made a lot, if the profits counted as they stand in the book, and not in the cassa.”²⁵ Although de Geer was doubtless right that Louis XIII did not pay all his debts to Hoeufft, Hoeufft nevertheless was able in 1628 to acquire an office of “esleuz dans le resort de la chamber des comptes et cour des aydes de Paris”, allowing him to recover his debts in offices that permitted him to collect taxes.²⁶

Intermediary with Sweden

While on the one hand Hoeufft had begun to be an important creditor and furnisher of arms to the French crown, both mercantile and political concerns began to deepen his connections with Protestant mercantile and political elites. His family began to involve him more closely with affairs and financing of other Protestant powers. Diderick Hoeufft, together with Gerhart Thijns [Gerdt Thiens], (most likely unhappily) loaned the archduke of Hesse-Kassel fifty thousand guilden in 1626.²⁷ Thiens was the brother in law of the *Bewindhebber* of the Dutch West India Company and great merchant Samuel Blommaert, who also shared kin relations to Hoeufft through the Coijmans.²⁸ In September, he visited the French extraordinary ambassador Hercule de Charnacé in Amsterdam, in close conjunction with the

²¹ See Morera, 116-117, and Archives Nationales, Paris. (AN), Minutier central (M.C.), LXXIII, 295, 29 December 1621, and AN, M.C. LXXIII, 296, 22 January 1621 is the contract between the two Hoeufft brothers and Nevers to bring the ships “que Heuft a fait construire en Hollande” from Amsterdam to Havre or Honfleur; the price for the voyage, 13 500 livres. See Parrott, *Business of War*, 38-39. This included over 1500 muskets, see 9 September 1621, #1746, RSG, 5 p. 277.

²² AN, MC, CV, 361, 1 March 1624.

²³ 10 October 1624, #689, RSG, 7, p. 119.

²⁴ 13 March 1625, #1664, RSG, 7, p. 291.

²⁵ Minute of Louis de Geer to Pieter Trip, (14/29 [April] 1627), in E.W. Dahlgren, ed. *Louis de Geers Brev och Affärshandlingar, 1614-1652*. Historiska Handlingar, del 29. (Stockholm: P.A. Norstedt, 1934), #72, 119, “Ick kenne het fransche hof te wel. Heuft moet er noch al veel van hebben, heeft hij der veel bij gewonnen, die proffijten achte al int boeck staen, ende niet in cassa.”

²⁶ Morera, *Op. Cit.*, 121-122, is very rich here.

²⁷ RSG, digital edition, 28/03/1626, 1 available at <http://www.historici.nl/Onderzoek/Projecten/BesluitenStaten-generaal1626-1651/silva/sg/resoluties/1626/03/28/resoluties/01>, 21/03/1626, 14, available at <http://www.historici.nl/Onderzoek/Projecten/BesluitenStaten-generaal1626-1651/silva/sg/resoluties/1626/03/21/resoluties/1431/03/1626,7> and 23/03/31, 6 at <http://www.historici.nl/Onderzoek/Projecten/BesluitenStaten-generaal1626-1651/silva/sg/resoluties/1626/03/31/resoluties/07>, all accessed 11 April 2013.

²⁸ P.W Klein, *De Trippen in de 17^e Eeuw : Een Studie over het ondernemersgedrag op de Hollandse Stapelmarkt*. (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1965), 326-327, note 17.

Swedish merchant and treasury official Erik Larsson, who attempted to give Charnacé a richly jewelled portrait of Gustavus Adolphus.²⁹

Larsson, of course, would be present when king Gustavus Adolphus and Charnacé signed the treaty at Bärwalde in January 1631 which promised French financial support for Swedish involvement in the German wars, and the king ennobled him and sent him back to the Netherlands with an instruction to act as factor over the war monies, as well as a factor managing the grain trade.³⁰ Another Swedish agent in Amsterdam at the time, Melchior Falckenberg, reported in early 1631 that “neither I or Erik Larsson could get any money on bills of exchange without the assistance of his factor Samuel Blommaert, who has been the caution for all the letters of exchange I have drawn on Hamburg and Danzig until this point.”³¹ Larsson, though, handled the subsidy monies largely himself; he travelled himself to Paris to accept the first payment, and sent his son Lorens to handle such payments in the future.³² Yet Gustavus Adolphus grew suspicious that Erik Larsson was in collusion with Dutch merchants and profiting from royal money, ordered him to come to his camp to explain himself, and replaced him with new factors who were not as well connected in Amsterdam, and were given the impossible task of simultaneously auditing Larsson’s activities, separating the crown’s obligations from merchants who the king distrusted—above all, the Trips—and maintaining the crown’s credit.³³ Even before Gustavus Adolphus’s death at Lützen these disputes caused Swedish credit to plummet, to the point that Louis de Geer held up subsidy money trying to recoup debts with the crown.³⁴

Richelieu’s strategy of waging war using the purse faced multiple pressures following the battle of Lützen, and it was in this moment that Hoeffft came to occupy a central place in the structure of the French alliances. First and foremost, Swedish Chancellor Axel Oxenstierna had to find a way to settle the finances of the German war. As Roland Nordlund has noted, the immediate priority was to organize a system of contributions in Germany, in conjunction with the League of Heilbrönn, and donations to German military entrepreneurs so that the war would largely pay for itself. This caused tensions above all with Duke Bernhard of Saxen Weimar, who could not immediately see why the Swedes should continue to command his armies without paying substantially.³⁵ Other German allies came to the same conclusion, a trend that accelerated when Bernhard’s and Horn’s armies were defeated by Spanish, Bavarian and Imperial forces at the Battle of Nördlingen in September 1634; Swedish allies such as

²⁹ AAE, CP, Suède, 3 f. 75v, Journal de Charnacé, 8 September 1629.

³⁰ See the instruction for Erik Larsson (16 January 1631), in *Arkiv till upplysning om svenska krigens och krigsinrättningarnes historia*. (Stockholm: 1854-1861), I, 305 f, Gustavus Adolphus to Axel Oxenstierna (16 January 1631) in *Rikskansleren Axel Oxenstiernas skrifter och Brevväxling*, [AOSB], II, 1, #500, 682-684, and Lars Ekholm, “Kontributioner och Krediter: Svensk krigsfinansiering 1630-1631,” in *Det kontinentala krigets ekonomi*, 181-183.

³¹ Melchior Falckenberg to Axel Oxenstierna (27 January 1631), Stockholm, Riksarkivet, [RA] Oxenstiernska Samlingen, E 597b, ”här till haffwer hwarken iagh eller Erich Larßon kunnadt få penningar på wexell, uthan hans factors Samuel Blommaerts tillhielp, hwilken haffwer warit borgen för alla waxlar som båda Erich Larßon och iagh haffwar dragit båda på Dansick och Hamborg allt här till.”

³² See the PS of Axel Oxenstierna to Gabriel Gustafsson Oxenstierna (16-19 September 1631), AOSB, I, 6, #186, 457, and Erik Larsson to Axel Oxenstierna, (8/18 November 1631), AOSB, II, 11, #14, 467.

³³ The best account of this is Georg Wittrock, *Svenska handelskompaniet och kopparhandeln under Gustaf II Adolf*. (Uppsala: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1919), 145-149, see also Ekholm, 232.

³⁴ See, particularly, Conrad Falkenberg to Axel Oxenstierna 5/15 June 1632 and 6/16 October 1632, AOSB, II, 11, #32-33, 612-616,

³⁵ Roland Nordlund, “Krig genom ombud: De Svenska krigsfinanserna och Heilbronnförbundet 1633,” in *Det kontinentala krigets ekonomi*, 271-451.

Wilhelm V of Hessen-Kassel, not to mention Württemberg and the Palatine, looked to accept subsidies directly from the French, undercutting Swedish claims to lead and threatening the prospect of any recompense or reward for involvement in the German war.³⁶

It is in this context that Hoeffft begins his surviving correspondence with Axel Oxenstierna directly.³⁷ The correspondence reveals him already in close connection with Cardinal Richelieu and his financial officials, working to obtain good assignments for the Swedish subsidy payments.³⁸ Hoeffft reported to Oxenstierna about his efforts to gain payment for the last term of the 1632 subsidies, which (notoriously) would not be paid until 1636.³⁹ On 28th May, 1633, Oxenstierna gave Hoeffft the formal charge to collect the French subsidies to the Swedish army, and provided a commission to present to Louis XIII.⁴⁰

Looking for additional revenues, Oxenstierna turned to copper and to better control of the French subsidy payments. After Gustavus Adolphus's death, Oxenstierna had initially attempted to set the sale of copper free, and break the immediate link between the copper market, the Swedish crown's credit, and war finance.⁴¹ The copper trade had gone through a dizzying number of permutations in the winter and spring of 1634, as Louis de Geer and Erik Larsson had attempted to corner the market, only to have their feet cut out by the Elias Trip, who seized their stocks of copper as security against their debts with the Swedish crown. After deciding against a lawsuit, Larsson agreed on behalf of the Swedish crown to a new company, organized by the Trips, that would exercise a monopoly over all Swedish copper exports for the next four years. The Trips invested the most with Elias Trip alone pledging 675,000 guilden. De Geer contributed 500,000, Larsson 125,000. A Jacob Kriwes from Lübeck contributed 300,000 and Daniel Godin another 150,000. The Dutch merchant and close collaborator of Charnacé Guillaume Bartolotti contributed 250,000. Jan Hoeffft contributed 75,000, and his nephew Mattieu Hoeffft another 25,000.⁴² On advice from the Dutch tapestry merchant, organizer of the Livonian war-tolls, and general fiscal and economic *factotum* Pieter Spieringk,

³⁶ See the account in Peter H. Wilson, *The Thirty Years War: Europe's Tragedy*. (London: Penguin, 2009), 549-553.

³⁷ A confession is in order; I'm relying on photocopies of the letters, which did not include the addresses. As the first letters in RA, Oxen. Sam E 622a are addressed to "Monsieur et intime Amijs," (29 April 1633, 17 April 1633, 10 June 1633), they are clearly not to Oxenstierna, who is addressed as "Son Ex:ce" in a letter of 21 June 1633. I rather suspect the first letters are to Pieter Spieringk, but will hope there are addresses that someone neglected to copy that will allow me to sort this out.

³⁸ Unfortunately, a large correspondence between Hoeffft and the Bouthilliers which still existed at the end of the 18th century appears to have vanished. See Jacques LeLong, *Bibliothèque historique de la France, contenant le Catalogue des Ouvrages, imprimés & manuscrits, qui traitent de l'Histoire de ce Royaume, ou qui y ont rapport ; avec des notes Critiques et Historiques*. (Paris : Jean-Thomas Herissant, 1769-1778), Tome III, 97, #30743, » Ms. Lettres de M. Hoeffft, Banquier, employé par le Roi en Hollande, depuis le 15 Novembre 1635 jusqu'au 11 Octobre 1645. Ces quatre recueils [étoient] dans la Bibliothèque de M. Bouthillier, ancien Evêque de Troyes : le premier 0.4, le second, L. 4 ; le troisième, V.5 ; & le quatrième X.5 »

³⁹Lars Ekholm, "Kontributioner och Krediter: Svensk krigsfinansiering 1630-1631", in *Det kontinentala krigets ekonomi: Studier i krigsfinansiering under svensk stormaktstid* (Uppsala, 1971), 153-270, and Tor Berg, "En fransk subsidieutbetalning till Axel Oxenstierna, 1636" *Historisk Tidskrift* 74 (1954): 63-68. These problems are not handled in Lorenz, Gottfried. "Schweden Und Die Französische Hilfgelder Von 1638 Bis 1649: Ein Beitrag Zur Finanzierung Des Krieges Im 17. Jahrhundert." In *Forschungen Und Quellen Zur Geschichte Des Dreißigjährigen Krieges*, edited by Konrad Repgen (Münster: Aschendorff, 1981) 98-148.

⁴⁰ Axel Oxenstierna to Hoeffft (28 May 1633) and Louis XIII (same date), in AOSB, I, 8, #326-327, 731-733.

⁴¹ See, for example, Axel Oxenstierna to Kungl. Maj:t (10 May 1635), AOSB, I, 11 (2), #402, 687, and (15 August 1634), I, 12, #164, 282-284.

⁴² See "Bolagsordning för Elias Trips kopparkompani," 13 June 1634, in *Louis de Geers Brev*, #214, 317-320, and Dahlgren, *Louis de Geer*, 217-228, and P.W. Klein, 379 ff, particularly 380, with a complete list of the participants.

Oxenstierna feared that this contract would “make us Trip’s slaves,” and more generally advised the Royal Council that they should not ratify the contract, because if it were, we “all together would be the slaves of the merchants of Amsterdam and the Crown always subject to them and their arrests.”⁴³ Faced with the Crown’s refusal to ratify the contract, as well as squabbling among participants, the company came to naught, though Mattieu Hoeffft remained involved in Swedish copper, becoming a part owner of Nacka’s brass foundry.⁴⁴

With copper being an unsure foundation, Oxenstierna turned to assuring proper control over the French subsidy money. In early 1635, Peter Spieringck travelled to France, where he met with a range of officials to insure the prompt and reliable payment and transmission of French subsidies.⁴⁵ (Indeed, one of the first tasks that Hugo Grotius carried out as Sweden’s ambassador was to solicit Claude Bouthillier, the Superintendent of Finances, to help spring Spieringck from jail in Calais, where he had been incarcerated while trying to leave for Holland; Grotius noted that Spieringck, “knowing he had enemies, which those who administer finances never lack, had found it advisable to travel incognito through Germany and while crossing France.”)⁴⁶ Apart from the discussions Spieringck and Hoeffft had, Spieringck also left his book-keeper Peter Heltscher in Paris, where visited Hoeffft to arrange the methods of payment.⁴⁷ Hoeffft would transmit the payment to Mattieu Hoeffft in Amsterdam, who would arrange for further exchanges to Jacob Verpoorten Adriansson in Hamburg. In addition, Hoeffft was related to a family of Hamburg bankers, the von Spreckelsen, with whom he had long done business. These ties would be very valuable, for it provided a kinship relation between Hoeffft and the Swedish resident and manager of the war-treasury Johan Adler Salvius, and on occasion the subsidies would be deposited in Spreckelsen’s account in the Amsterdam Wisselbanck.⁴⁸ However, payments from subsidy money could be paid either in Amsterdam, where letters were often drawn upon Mattieu Hoeffft, or on Verpoorten in Hamburg.⁴⁹

These relations with Hoeffft proved more durable than the more formal representation by ambassadors. When, in 1635, Grotius was named Swedish ambassador, Hoeffft retained charge of the money, independent of Grotius’s oversight. Grotius complained that Hoeffft was

⁴³ See Axel Oxenstierna to Gabriel Gustavson Oxenstierna (12 April 1634), AOSB, I, 11(2), #339, 596, and “Memorial för Lars Grubbe,” (20 May 1634), AOSB, I, 11 (2), #431, 737-738, §4. “alle tillsammans Amsteldameske köpmans slavar och chronan altijdh desse och deres arrest underkastadt...” On Spieringck, see Einar Wendt, *Det svenska licentwäsendet i Preussen, 1627-1635*(Uppsala: Almqvist & Wiksells, 1933), and Badeloch Noldus, “Dealings in politics and art: agents between Amsterdam, Stockholm and Copenhagen,” *Scandinavian Journal of History*, 28, 3 (2003): 215-225.

⁴⁴ Louis de Geer to Gerdt Thyns, Samuel Blommaert, and Mattieu Hoeffft, 8/18 March 1636, in *Louis de Geers Brev*, #237, 347-348,

⁴⁵ Spieringck to Axel Oxenstierna from Delft, (1/11 March, 1635), RA: Oxen.Sam.E727.

⁴⁶ Grotius to Claude Bouthillier, (25 February 1635), *Briefwisseling van Hugo Grotius*, V, #189, 329, “sçachant qu’il a des enemies, qui ne manquent jamais à ceux qui administrent les finances, avoit trouvé bon de passer incognu par l’Allemagne et traversant la France s’embarquer à Calais. » See also Axel Oxenstierna to Paul Strassburg, (10 March 1635), AOSB, I, 13, #70, 182.

⁴⁷ See Peter Heltscher to Axel Oxenstierna, 11 March 1636, RA: Oxen. Sam. E697, and Spieringck to A.O., (28 January 7 February 1635), 5/15 March and 2_/3_ [May] 1635), RA: Oxen Sam.E 727.

⁴⁸ See Heiko Droste, “Johan Adler Salvius i Hamburg: Ett nätverksbygge i 1600-talets Sverige,” in *Mare Nostrum: Om Westfaliska freden och Östersjön som ett svenskt maktcentrum* (Stockholm: Riksarkivet, 1999), 243-256; On Salvius, see Johan Adler Salvius, *Problem kring Freden, Krigsekonomien och maktkampen* (Lund: Lindstedts, 1945).

⁴⁹ See, for example, Römelingh, *Op. Cit.*, 451, for examples of such payments.

“interested only in personal profit” to no avail.⁵⁰ Despite this, Grotius seemed to have regarded Hoeufft as a friend, and when Carl Gustav visited Paris in 1639, Hoeufft attended the party at his house, along with another banker Joachim de Wicquefort.⁵¹ When Grotius lost the trust of both the French and his Swedish employers, Hoeufft maintained the quotidian demands of the alliance.⁵² Managing the fiscal side of foreign affairs was, in itself, likely highly profitable, for he could set an exchange rate well above the market rate and not be challenged; he preferred to be paid in cash up front for subsidy payments, but on one occasion when he loaned money, he was paid very nearly half of the total subsidy to Swedes in exchange charges and interest.⁵³ Heoufftt was likely to make payments on assignments in Paris; he certainly allowed Johan Oxenstierna to run up debts with him.⁵⁴

Bernhard of Saxe Weimar:

[The substantive work on this section remains to be done.]⁵⁵

In the wake of Nördlingen and the loss of many areas of the Empire available to raise and steal funds, Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar decided to leave Swedish service, and instead direct his army in French service. After haggling about the terms, Claude Bullion agreed to a contract in which France would pay four million livres a year to keep an army of 18,000 in the field.⁵⁶ Here, too, Jean Heoufftt was the intermediary who arranged the payment of the subsidy, or at least the amount that the French saw fit to pay. Saxe-Weimar developed a substantial fortune over time—estimated to be 1,200,000 livres in 1637—a substantial amount of which, some 450,000 livres, he had on deposit with Hoeufft.⁵⁷ As Redlich suggested long ago, this, shaped the nature of the contract. Redlich argued that “slowly, although retaining his own financial apparatus, Bernhard became more and more dependent upon a banker (Hoeufft) who really served Bernhard’s war lord (the King of France), and after his death Bernhard’s own financial organization also became a tool of the war lord.”⁵⁸

Political Relations with the Netherlands

As early as June, 1629, the French ambassador in the Hague Nicolas de Bar de Baugy wrote Richelieu that the States General had requested that Hoeufft should be allowed to export

⁵⁰ See Oxenstierna to Chavigny, (23 April 1635) AOSB, I, 13, #105, 245, and *Briefwisseling van Hugo Grotius, V deel, 311, #1976, Grotius aan P. Schmalz 1635 februar 14*. See also “Memorial för sekreteraren Peter Smalz” (21 November 1635), in AOSB, I, 14, #421, 261-262.

⁵¹ See Henk Nellen, *Hugo de Groot: Een leven in strijd om de vrede, 1583-1645*. (Amsterdam: Uitgeverij Balans, 2007), 399—for the party—and he qualifies Hoeufft as Grotius’s friend on 450.

⁵² Thus, for example, Hoeufft transmitted news of the Swedish armies to Bullion, who further relayed it to Richelieu, long before Grotius was granted an audience. See Bullion to Richelieu (23 October 1636), in AAE, MDFrance, 822, f. 105.

⁵³ For his preference to be paid in cash, see Bullion to Richelieu, 1 Octobre, 1636, AAE, MD France, 822, f. 2. For the details of the interest and exchange rates, see Bullion to Richelieu, 30 July [1638], f. 274.

⁵⁴ See Johan Heoufftt to Axel Oxenstierna, 9 September 1642 and 26 April 1645, RA, Oxen Sam, E.622a.

⁵⁵ I have not yet read Gustav Droysen’s *Bernhard von Weimar* or consulted the document collection August von Gonzenbach, *Der General H.L. von Erlach von Castelen: Ein Lebens- und Charakter-bild aus den Zeiten des dreissigjährigen Kriegs*. (Bern: 1880-1882), which Redlich suggests points to archival holdings that illuminate Hoeufft’s relations with Bernhard.

⁵⁶ See Parrott, *Op.Cit.*, 107-109.

⁵⁷ Redlich, *Op.Cit.*, 407-408.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 253-254.

grain from Rouen to the Republic as their commissioner.⁵⁹ Here, too, Hoeffft's role seems to have intensified in conjunction with broader political changes. In the summer of 1634, the Stadhouder Frederik Hendrik wavered between supporting a peace treaty with Spain supported by the major commercial cities, and breaking off talks in the hope of retaining territorial gains made by the West India Company in Brazil.⁶⁰ Charnacé, at the same moment, was in Paris negotiating with Johan van Knuyt and the Pensionary of Holland Adrian Pauw over the conditions of the French alliance with a prolongation of the French alliance with a clear subtext of the eventual open entry of France into the war. Pauw hoped for a rapid peace, and thus feared the French alliance would prolong the war by preventing separate peace negotiations. Hoeffft entered into correspondence with Francis van Aerssen, a diplomat who had become a close confidant of Frederik Hendrik, working in conjunction to advance the cause of continued war and the continued French alliance. Van Aerssen read two letters from Hoeffft to the Prince "while suppressing the name of their author", giving hope based on discussions with Claude de Bullion that France was prepared to join in open war against the Spanish; the Prince, in return, praised Hoeffft's work advancing the Dutch cause, noting that while he could not replace the ambassador, "he was of the opinion, and it is true, that often one opens more freely to a particular friend, than to public persons, who are treated with ceremony and reserve."⁶¹ Van Aerssen sent him a new cipher, in order to aid his communications with Bullion.⁶² However, the cipher arrived too late; Pauw intercepted letters that revealed Hoeffft was working behind his back to attain a negotiation.⁶³ In short, while Hoeffft was acting as an informal agent to convince Bullion and other French Councilors that it was a favourable moment to declare war, he was also acting to influence Dutch politics on the sensitive and indeed central issue of the day. Interestingly, Aerssens suggested that they could discredit Pauw before he complained to the States General by claiming his criticism of Hoeffft had its root in material interest because Pauw hoped to get his brother Michel put in charge of the transfer of the subsidies.⁶⁴

France declared war on Spain in May, initiating a summer in which nearly all the French campaigns had been abject failures, destroying hopes for a rapid victory.⁶⁵ The papal emissary Giulio Mazarini arrived at the French court, and the Prince of Orange, as well as many other Dutchmen, felt that he intended to broker a peace between France and Spain, and began considering making a separate peace themselves; intercepted letters between the King of Spain and the Cardinal Infant seemed to indicate that the prince of Orange intended to use his influence to bring the States to make peace with the Spanish. At the moment, there were two French ambassadors in the Netherlands, both noblemen and particularly close clients of the Cardinal. Richelieu's brother in law the marquis of Brézé was ambassador extraordinary, who

⁵⁹ Archives des Affaires Etrangères, Paris (AAE): Correspondence politique (CP) Hollande, 12: f. 105: Baugy a Richelieu, de la Haye, ce 18 juin 1629 « La grace que Messieurs les Estatz demandent au Roy pour la permission de faire achepter par ung nommé Jehan Heufft demeurant a Roüen quelque quantité de bledz po: transporter pardeça.»

⁶⁰ See Jonathan Israel, *The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness and Fall*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 517-527.

⁶¹ Aerssens to Hoeffft, (5 June 1634), printed in *Archives ou correspondance inedite de la maison d'Orange-Nassau*. [AMO] Groen van Prinsterer, ed. (Utrecht: Kemick, 1859), Series 2, deel 3, DIII, 58-63, quote 58.

⁶² Aerssens to Frederik Hendrik, (15 June 1634), AMO, 2, 3, DV, 65.

⁶³ Hoeffft to Aerssens, (5 August 1634), AMO, 2, 3, DVII, 67-68.

⁶⁴ Aerssens to the Prince of Orange,

⁶⁵ See Parrott, *Richelieu's Army*, 112-117.

kept in close proximity to Frederik Hendrik as commander of the French expeditionary force. The ordinary ambassador Hercule de Charnacé had married Brézé's aunt, and also served in the field in Frederik Hendrik's company.

A memorandum about “means . . .to remedy the affairs of Holland” most likely in the hand of Richelieu's private secretary Charpentier, reveals that the Cardinal might have considered the two ambassadors insufficient, as it began “Send a man capable of speaking and acting,” as well as “money to distribute to people should there be need.”⁶⁶ Hoeffft was that man; Richelieu instructed him to travel to Holland, make arrangements to levy Cossacks in Danzig for the following spring campaign, but also to meet the Prince of Orange and members of the States General, give them a letter from the Cardinal, and assure them that Louis had no intention of breaking the truce.⁶⁷ He certainly had money. Louis XIII granted Hoeffft permission to export 400,000 livres worth of foreign coins from France in June of 1635, because the war had so perturbed the bill of exchange market that no one would accept bills for the entire subsidy.⁶⁸ He received neither accreditation as an ambassador, nor formal powers to negotiate a treaty, merely verbal instructions from the Cardinal, but instructions to consult with Charnacé and Brézé were only added as an afterthought. Hoeffft rapidly traveled to Holland, where he directly met with the Prince of Orange and a number of members of the States General over three days. He remained in Holland until March, continuing to meet with the Prince of Orange and members of the States.

Even though Hoeffft personally obliged himself to pay the debts that the two men had contracted on behalf of the French troops they commanded, Hoeffft's appearance humiliated both ambassadors, who bemoaned their fate.⁶⁹ Both men offered to resign. Brézé could only understand the act as a deliberate insult, caused by Richelieu's mind being poisoned by his particular rival Father Joseph.⁷⁰ He sent a memorandum for the two ambassadors back to Richelieu, annotated with his comments. He commented on the description of Hoeffft's meeting with the States and the Prince of Orange, “that it was a great idea, that's succeeded just wonderfully, to commit the King's affairs to a foreign merchant, when there were two of His Majesty's ambassadors' here, the fidelity and affection of whom one can not question, nor the capacity of the ordinary [ambassador.]”⁷¹ At roughly the same time, he wrote to the secretary of state Chavigny, protesting that “I am at the point of desiring, rather than fearing, banishment

⁶⁶ « Moyens qui semblent plus convenables pour remedier a l'affaire de Holande, » [1636], AAE, CP Hollande, 18, f. 336, « Envoyer un homme capable de parler et d'agir, » et « Argent pour distribuer aux personnes dont en aura besoin. »

⁶⁷ See the “Instruction pour Heufft,” (Paris, 15 November 1635), AAE, CP Hollande, 17, piece 97, unsigned, but with the note “tout ce que dessus est conformé à l'instruction verbale qui a esté donné de la part de sa Ma :té par Monsieur le Cardinal duc de Richelieu. » Interestingly, this instruction notes that Hoeffft should first praise the King's good faith, but then also argue « Que par raison d'Estat, il ne se peut ne se doit faire aucune paiz. . . »

⁶⁸ Nationaal Archief, Den Haag, 1.01.08, Staten Generaal, 12587.54: “Een copie authentijck van en paspoort voor Sr. Jan Heuft tot transport van 400000 lvr in vreemde specien van 10:e junij 1635”

⁶⁹ Den Haag, Nationaal Archief, 1.01.08 Staten Generaal, 12587-60, “Secreete Casse: Vranckryck: Acten obligatoir van 't Heeren Amb:rs Brezé en Charnacé, als die van 't Commissaris Hoeffft van te . . .kosten der fransche troupes...(18 March to 18 May 1636), with the first page a promise in Hoeffft's hand and signed by him promising to pay the troops' debts. (18 March 1636).

⁷⁰ Pierre Benoist, *Le père Joseph : L'Eminence grise de Richelieu*. (Paris : Perrin, 2007), 287, mentions Brézé's hatred of Joseph, but not Hoeffft or his mission.

⁷¹ “Memoire du 7 Decembre 1635 respondu par le Mareschal de Brezé », AAE, CP Hollande, 17, piece 113, « C'a este une belle pensée, et qui a fort bien reussy, de commettre des affaires du Roy a un marchand estrangier, y ayant deux Ambassad : de sa Majeste, de la fidelité et affection desquelz on ne peut non plus douter, que de la capacité de l'ordinaire. »

from Court, from France, prison, and even death. . . . In a word. . . if I must pass through such trials to witness that I am capable of grand tasks, I will make my declaration that without suffering through the examination I confess that I am in no way suitable.”⁷² Charnacé’s response was more measured; he appealed to Chavigny as a patron, fearing that he had offended the Cardinal. But he also questioned Hoeffft’s capabilities, raising questions about his discretion and abilities, and insinuating that it damaged the king’s reputation and his credibility to have “a man such as this” carrying his letters rather than a “bon seigneur.”⁷³

Having provoked such resentment from the ambassadors, Richelieu wrote explaining his decision to employ the merchant. He noted that if employing him was “malapropos, I had my part in these bad counsels. . . but not having power to negotiate a treaty, . . . [he was] solely sent to confirm as a merchant to imprint in the hearts of three quarters of a base people that which perhaps might have been suspicious to them if they heard it from the mouths of ambassadors.”⁷⁴ Richelieu’s explanation was doubtless cold comfort, for it suggested that merchants, and perhaps even interested merchants, might be more credible than ambassadors, who had after all to represent their king and maintain his honor. Yet it did reinforce the boundary between the actual representation of the king’s person in negotiations, and merely rhetorical persuasion.

Hoeffft’s return to France in March—bearing a letter from the Prince of Orange, asking Richelieu to believe the merchant’s account of the state of French troops—did not put an end to Hoeffft’s broader political roles and the resistance of ambassadors. For example, Richelieu had to carefully explain that although Hoeffft approved of trying to win the Clerk of the States General with a bribe, he had not invented the idea—even if his nephew Matthieu Hoeffft was to handle the cash.⁷⁵ (The Clerk accepted, and helped select a whole group of representatives in the States to buy, with Hoeffft and his nephew helping choose likely people and managing the cash.)⁷⁶ Hoeffft’s role as manager of the subsidies was formalized by a commission granted by the States General in May 1637 which confirmed his role as the manager of the subsidy, as well as any other monetary transaction the Republic needed to carry out in Paris.⁷⁷ His formal correspondence with the Staten Generaal, ranging from subsidy

⁷² Breze to Monsieur [Chavigny], 12 Decembre 1636, AAE, CP Hollande 17, Piece 126, “ie suis au point de desirer, au lieu de craindre, le banissement de la Court, de la France, la prison, et mesme la mort. . . .En un mot monsieur, s’il fault passer par ces espreuves pou tesmoigner que ie suis capable des grands emplois, ie fais ma desclaration, et sans subir l’examen, ie confesse que ie ne suis nullement propre. » See also his letter to Richelieu, of the same date, CP Hollande 18, f, 54.

⁷³ The solicitation for Protection is in Charnacé to Chavigny, (26 December 1635), CP Hollande, 17, piece, 139, the criticisms of Hoeffft’s manner of proceeding are in a letter of 20 December 1635, same volume, piece 133.

⁷⁴ Unsigned note, probably draft, 19 Jan [1636], AAE, CP Hollande, 18, f. 86, “Quant a ce qui concerne l’envoye du S:r Hoeffft, je vous advoue que s’il a esté faict mal apropos, j’ay ma part a ce mauvais conseil. . .mais n’ayant aucun pouvior de traiter, quoy que ce puis estre, et ayant seulement envoyé pour confirmer comme marchand et imprimer dans les coeurs du tiers et du quart d’un peuple grossier ce qui leur seroit peut estre suspect, s’ilz ne l’entendoient que de la bouche des ambassadeurs. »

⁷⁵ See Richelieu to Charnacé, 22 April 1636, AAE, CP Hollande, Sup. 1, f 115; see also 30 Juin, f, 123, and 8 August 1636, f. 125.

⁷⁶ See, for this, particularly Charnacé to Richelieu, CP Hollande, 17, f. 537, with a list of members of the states offered bribes—92 thousand livres, in total—and who accepted.

⁷⁷ Den Haag : Nationaal archief, 1.01.06, Staten-Generaal: Commissie boeken van de Staten-Generaal, 1626-1639, 241, 28 Mai 1637, “Commissie voor Johan Heuft als commissaris in onse Gelt saecken en finantien in Vranckrijck.”

payments to reassurances about the sentiments of French Councilors, only increased from this time.⁷⁸

Arms dealing, banking and ambassadors

Hoeufft, in other words, occupied a prominent place in the network of political interests that bound together France's structure of alliances during the Thirty Years War. In some sense, his political interests were so tightly interwoven with his financial and mercantile interests that they are difficult to disentangle. His arms sales to the French crown, for example, increased massively after France's open entry into the war, when accounts of Hoeufft's arms purchases begin to litter Richelieu's papers, even if their exact amount is not known.⁷⁹ He continued to accumulate offices in France, but had enough capital and credit available to direct a massive draining of polders in Poitou that required roughly a million livres of working capital.⁸⁰ If anything, his contacts with the States General intensified during the years of open war, and he continued to play a variety of roles for the French. (On another occasion, in somewhat murky circumstances, Hoeufft revealed a spy who was confined in the Bastille.)⁸¹ More practically, he made sure to ingratiate himself with Richelieu and his creatures, by, for example, using English contacts to procure tin and lead for the Bouthilliers' roofs and fountains at a remarkable discount.⁸² His service would continue into Mazarin's ministry, although the details of his career become murkier.⁸³

Hoeufft's activities could provoke resistance. During the revolt of the Nu-Pieds in Normandy in 1639, rioting crowds in Rouen sacked his house along with that of the intendant Michel Le Tellier, doubtless angered as much by his proximity to the regime as by his evident prosperity.⁸⁴ However, resistance also came from within the elite. Other French representatives did not sack Hoeufft's house, but instead questioned that he was really interested in the service of the crown. Even the wealthy *converso* banker and merchant Alphonse Lopez—himself an infamous diplomatic meddler—wrote Richelieu, questioning

⁷⁸ Based on a quick look at den Haag: Nationaal archief, 12 587-70. Letters from Hoeufft to Estates and Secretaris van Eskerckke, 1637, and 1.01.04 Staten Generaal, 6764, Brieven van particulari an Staten-Generaal, Frankryck, 1635-1637." See also 1.01.08, Staten-Generaal, 12574.43. "Verscheiden resolution op de bekeningen van de Fransche subsidie gedaan door Johan Heuft."

⁷⁹ See for examples, "Compte des armes achetes par Heouffft, decembre 1635-avril 1636", (totals 222,979 livres,) A.A.E., Mémoires et documents, France. 823, f. 219, another account on f. 296. In 1638, he sold three ships to the Crown, see MD France, 830, f. 187. The secretary of state Brasset addressed the Staten General on 11 July 1635, asking permission for Mattieu Hoeufft to export 2000 curaissees and 3000 muskets on behalf of Jean Hoeufft, for French service. Archief Nationaal, 1.01.64, Brieven van particulari aan Staten-Generaal, Frankryck, 1635-1637. On 13 January 1642, Louis XIII asked for the States General permission for him to export 200,000 [pond?] copper, 300,000 [pond?] powder, and 300,000 of lead. 1.01.04 Staten Generaal, brieven van den Coninck. . . , 13 January 1642. David Parrot, however, only mentions Hoeufft on one page, making it clear, however, that Hoeufft was accorded special treatment by Bullion. See *Richelieu's Army: War, Government and Society in France. 1624-1642* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 263.

⁸⁰ See Morera, 121-122, and 124-143.

⁸¹ See Bullion to Richelieu [30 January 1637], AAE, MD France, 825, f. 87.

⁸² See Claude Bouthillier to Bellievre, (30 July 1638), BN, FF 15915, f 148.

⁸³ Claude Dulong, *Mazarin et l'argent : Banquiers et prête-noms*. (Paris : École des Chartes, 2002), 190-191, 207-208. The orders for metals seem to have continued, too. See Den Haag, Nationaal Archief, 1.01.04 Staten Generaal, brieven van den Coninck. . ." 24 January 1645.

⁸⁴ See the *Inventaire-sommaire des archives communales antérieurs à 1790 : Ville de Rouen* Ch. de Robillard de Beaufrepaire, ed. (Rouen : Julien LeCerf, 1887), I, 318.

Hoeufft's disinterested service.⁸⁵ Hoeufft defended himself directly from such charges, writing ambassadors to justify his rates.⁸⁶

Hoeufft, in short, shows the limitations of French formal diplomatic representation to meet the demands of France's Protestant alliances; he possessed and cultivated a wide range of financial and political contacts, and was trusted and in some manner viewed as an agent of France, the States General, the Kingdom of Sweden and, for that matter, Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar. One can only regard France's formal diplomatic network as sufficient to maintain the King's foreign policy, if one neglects that formal negotiations had to be anchored in the family networks, face to face connections, and personal relations that constituted credit in the early modern period. Few, if any, French Catholic noblemen possessed these relations with politicians in the Northern Protestant world, not to speak of merchants. Hoeufft did, and profited from his position. His profiting might actually have engendered trust, as surely he had much to lose from the failure of France's Protestant alliances.

Resistance to diplomatic interlopers, though, did help shape French ambassadorial practices and identity. While the discrete Hoeufft attracted little attention, pamphlets attacked Richelieu's employment of the more flamboyant Alphonse Lopez as yet another symptom of a politics that made merchandise of the King of France's power and reputation.⁸⁷ Yet Richelieu's distinction between Hoeufft's mission and the true role of a representative was more vital in the long run, for it focused upon the representing the king as a negotiator. As Ellen McClure has observed, this demanded that the negotiator represent sovereign authority in a parallel manner to the sovereign's representation of God on earth.⁸⁸ The title of François de Callières *De la manière de négocier avec les souverains* is no accident, for its emphasis upon the negotiation as the touchstone of an ambassador's value reflects precisely the challenge of presenting and realizing the demands and intentions of his master while retaining the sang-froid and honesty demanded by such a performance, that is, incarnating the king while remaining completely one's self.⁸⁹ The emphasis on negotiation as the ambassador's central task rendered diplomacy an aristocratic art, for it elevated cultivation and prudential self-mastery over other assets. But such a performance involved carefully cultivated talents, and could potentially be mastered by a merchant as well as by a man of noble birth. Both Callières and that merchant turned ambassador Abraham de Wicquefort argued that noble birth "lends splendor to the embassy, and if good birth is accompanied by those natural habits which stem from birth, it renders the ambassador even more suitable for such an eminent charge."⁹⁰ Yet Wicquefort, perhaps with his family background firmly in mind, named several merchants—including Pieter Spierinck—who had been merchants before being honorable ambassadors, and

⁸⁵ Lopez to Richelieu, (13 February 1640), AAE, CP Hollande 21, no foliation.

⁸⁶ Hoeufft to Claude de Mesmes, Count d'Avaux, (19 November 1639), B.N., Baluze, 169, no foliation, "Les pertes me seroient insupportables, si elles ne fassent considerez a quoy je travaille. »

⁸⁷ See, for example, the *Catolicon François, ou les plainctes de deux chasteaux, rapportées par Renaudot, Maistre du Bureau d'adresse* (1636, Bibliothèque Mazarine, cat. # 17558).

⁸⁸ Ellen M. McClure, *Sunspots and the Sun King: Sovereignty and Mediation in Seventeenth Century France* (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2006), Chapters 3 and 4.

⁸⁹ I profited here from Jean-Claude Waquet's *François de Callières L'Art de Négocier en France sous Louis XIV*. (Paris : Editions Rue d'Ulm, 2005), 107-169.

⁹⁰ Abraham de Wicquefort, *L'Ambassador et ses fonctions* (The Hague : 1680-81), I, 154. "S'il la prend dans une Maison illustre, ou dans une famille noble, elle donne un grand éclat à l'Ambassade, & si elle est accompagnée d'habitudes naturelles, qui la relevent, elles rendent l'Ambassadeur d'autant plus propre pour cet eminent employ. »

certainly preferred merchants to too pedantic *gens de lettres*.⁹¹ Wicquefort's account of the functions of an ambassador did not include banking, money, or arms-dealing; indeed, he implied that a merchant needed to leave such mundane activities behind before taking on the role of an ambassador. Historians have too often followed Wicquefort and neglected to include in their histories of diplomacy those, like Hoeufft, whose assets allowed negotiations and the politics of alliance to take place. Yet should those historians pursue Hoeufft and Wicquefort too far, one risks going beyond those negotiations and alliances to the economic and social changes intimately linked to the political fortunes of a small group of trans-European military and political enterprisers.

⁹¹ *Ibid*, 77-78. For the Wicqueforts' activities, see Pierre-François Burger, "Res Angusta domi: les Wicquefort et leurs métiers bien délicats entre Paris, Amsterdam, et Pärnu, »*Francia : Forschungen zur westeuropäischen Geschichte*. 27, 2(2001) :25-58.